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Abstract
Indicators are increasingly used in international human rights monitoring, and time, expertise 
and resources are being devoted in ever-growing quantities to the production of  more appar-
ently powerful and sophisticated ways to objectively measure human rights performance. 
However, there is a certain level of  resistance and scepticism to the statistical measurement 
of  human rights on the part of  many practitioners and advocates, who argue that it is reduc-
tionist and disruptive to their work. This article uses the writing of  Michael Oakeshott as 
a lens through which to examine the shift towards indicators and argues that it is a project 
that is strongly characterized by rationalism: a desire for certainty, uniformity and clarity 
that neglects the experiential, tacit, and conversational. This not only provides a method for 
analysing the dangers present in the phenomenon but also explains why the reliance on indica-
tors and other measurement methods seems destined to grow despite the reservations held by 
practitioners and scholars alike.
1 Introduction
Mary Robinson once envisioned a ‘science of  human dignity’ based on the use of  sta-
tistics in monitoring human rights.1 For good or ill, the quest to construct this science 
is well underway. The monitoring of  human rights performance is increasingly domi-
nated by a culture of  indicators, benchmarks and statistical measurement. Perceived 
as a way to more accurately assess compliance, and to better elaborate the content of  
rights, indicators in particular have come to occupy a central role in the agenda of  
the United Nations (UN) treaty-based mechanisms. At the same time, there is a trend 
among human rights advocates to devote ever-increasing time and energy towards 
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bria.ac.uk. The author would like to thank Rebecca Moosavian and Sue Farran for their very helpful 
comments on an early draft of  this article.
1 M. Robinson, speech at the launch of  the American Association for the Advancement of  Science’s 
Science and Human Rights Coalition (2009), available at www.aaas.org/page/mary-robinson (last vis-
ited 25 March 2015).
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the creation of  more powerful, useful and specifically tailored statistical methods for 
measuring human rights performance.
This effort marks a significant shift in emphasis away from what might be called the 
‘traditional’ approach to human rights monitoring, which was largely (though by no 
means entirely) carried out as a discursive or narrative-based process. States parties 
would describe their efforts made towards the protection and promotion of  human 
rights, and treaty body members would consider those efforts based on their own 
expertise and judgment alongside reports from local advocates and non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs). The better approach is increasingly seen as being a process 
resembling an audit, certifying that relevant indicators are produced – and produced 
in the correct disaggregated fashion – and assessing the accuracy of  the data.
It would be an exaggeration to say that this shift signifies a rift in ‘the human rights 
community’, if  such a thing exists. Most of  those who support an increased role for 
indicators see them as simply another tool in the arsenal of  human rights monitor-
ing to go alongside existing mechanisms. Yet there is a concern that indicators are 
transforming ‘from a tool to a paradigm’ – that instead of  being complementary to 
traditional methods, they could come to dominate or supplant them.2 Indeed, there 
is a sense that this is already taking place, particularly given the developments within 
the Office of  the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and its efforts to 
systematize and standardize the uses of  indicators within the UN treaty body sys-
tem. Likewise, developments in academia in the field of  the statistical measurement 
of  human rights have proliferated with, undoubtedly, an attendant opportunity cost 
regarding other varieties of  research. Some scholars have expressed concern with this 
apparent shift towards audit-based procedures – a shift that marginalizes questions 
of  human judgment and, instead, focuses on methods of  verifying whether and how 
data is produced.
This article argues that this shift can be readily attributed to a strong rationalist 
propensity, as Michael Oakeshott would have described it, present within the move 
towards indicators. That is, the push for ever-more accurate and pervasive statisti-
cal measurement is strongly characterized by the application of  technique – by 
ever-greater centralization, uniformity and certainty, which means that, as with all 
rationalist projects, it tends to grow increasingly rationalist over time, and its rational-
ism comes to dominate and crowd out other methods of  thinking.
The move to indicators is ripe, then, for analysis from an Oakeshottian  perspective. 
The analysis presented here not only encompasses existing concerns about the domi-
nation of  human rights monitoring and discourse by indicators – the dangers of  unan-
ticipated consequences and the chilling effects that indicators have on conversation 
and dialogue – but also provides an explanation for why the project continues to grow; 
why it appears to represent not just a supplementary tool to traditional human rights 
monitoring but also the transformation of  a tool into a paradigm that displaces other 
perspectives. The article begins by describing the shift towards the use of  indicators in 
2 International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Report on Workshop – No Perfect Measure: 
Rethinking Evaluation and Assessment of  Human Rights Work (January 2012), at 3.
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the monitoring of  human rights, before explaining why this shift can be described as 
having a strong propensity towards rationalism. It then considers some of  the perni-
cious consequences of  this shift, before explaining why its rationalist propensity is so 
expansionist and transformative.
2 The Human Rights Indicator Project
It is difficult to think of  areas in the public sphere in the developed world, or in inter-
national governance in general, that have not come to be characterized by the use of  
purportedly objective, mostly numerical, measures indicating achievement or perfor-
mance and the resultant league tables and rankings. Some prominent examples listed 
in a recent collection on indicators3 are the Programme for International Student 
Assessment, which measures the educational achievements of  15-year-old students 
across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;4 the state fragil-
ity index used by the US Agency for International Development;5 and the yardsticks for 
the quality of  national laws regarding corporate bankruptcy used by the World Bank 
and the European Bank for Construction and Development when making decisions 
on lending.6 In the domestic sphere, examples from the literature are the US News 
and World Report’s ranking of  US law schools;7 performance indicators used by the 
Audit Commission to produce national league tables for local authorities in England 
and Wales across various national indicators;8 and the Research Assessment Exercise 
(now Research Evaluation Framework) used within the audit of  British higher educa-
tion institutions.9
The field of  international human rights is no exception to the general trend towards 
the use of  indicators and quantitative measurement. Indeed, in recent years, indica-
tors have become something of  a fad among advocates of  economic, social and cul-
tural rights and are commonly presented as a remedy to a perceived sense of  those 
rights’ marginalization.10 The shift to indicators is often seen as having come into 
being alongside a broader move towards an improved conceptualization of  economic, 
social and cultural rights over the past several decades.11 This is not to say, however, 
3 K. Davis et al. (eds) Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (2012).
4 Bogdany and Goldmann, ‘Taming and Framing Indicators: A  Legal Reconstruction of  the OECD’s 
Programme for International Student Assessment’, in Davis et al., supra note 3, 52.
5 Bhuta, ‘Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of  State Fragility and the Calculability of  Political 
Order’, in Davis et al., supra note 3, 132.
6 Halliday, ‘Legal Yardsticks: International Financial Institutions as Diagnosticians and Designers of  the 
Laws of  Nations’, in Davis et al., supra note 3, 180.
7 See, e.g., Espeland and Sauder, ‘Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds’, 
113(1) American Journal of  Sociology (2007) 1.
8 Discussed in Tsoukas, ‘The Tyranny of  Light’, 29(9) Futures (1997) 827, at 837–838.
9 See, e.g., Strathern, ‘The Tyranny of  Transparency’, 26(3) British Educational Research Journal (2000) 
309, at 309–321.
10 See, e.g., Welling, ‘International Indicators and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 30 Human Rights 
Quarterly (HRQ) (2008) 933.
11 Ibid, at 936–937.
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that the realization and monitoring of  civil and political rights has fallen outside of  its 
purview.
Human rights indicators and benchmarks have been in use since at least the early 
1990s, when the Special Rapporteur on the Realization of  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights recommended considering how indicators might be used in measur-
ing progression towards the realization of  such rights.12 Within the UN treaty body 
system, this largely took place in an ad hoc fashion as treaty bodies developed their 
working methods and interpretations of  treaty provisions. For instance, in 1999, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) issued its General 
Comment No. 13 on the Right to Education, in which it suggested that there was a 
minimum obligation for state parties to create a national education strategy allow-
ing monitoring through the use of  indicators and benchmarks.13 At the same time, 
however, there have been efforts to make the production of  indicators and their usage 
more systematic and widespread. A reader familiar with the literature on the quan-
titative measurement of  human rights performance will be aware of  a number of  
such projects. These include the SERF Index developed by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and 
colleagues,14 Todd Landman’s concepts of  rights in principle, practice and policy and 
their subdivision into indicators15 and the project to develop a specific suite of  indica-
tors for the right to health.16
By far the most significant such effort, however, has been the project undertaken by 
the UN’s OHCHR, initially at the behest of  the chairs of  the treaty bodies themselves, 
to systematize the production and usage of  human rights indicators. Beginning in 
2005 and culminating in the 2012 Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement 
and Implementation, this project has resulted in a conceptually unified approach that 
aims to produce a core set of  ‘universally relevant’ human rights indicators and a 
generally applicable method for generating them.17 This document has three main 
pillars. First, the preference is for the quantitative over the qualitative: ‘[F]act based 
or objective indicators, in contrast with judgement-based or subjective indicators, are 
verifiable and can be easier to interpret when comparing the human rights situation 
in a country over time and across populations.’18 By the same token, qualitative indi-
cators based on expert judgments are considered to be unreliable, unrepresentative, 
lacking in transparency and generally of  a ‘limited purpose’.19 The guide subdivides 
12 UN GAOR World Conference on Human Rights, Report of  the Secretariat: Report of  the Seminar on 
Appropriate Indicators to Measure Achievement in the Progressive Realization of  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/73 (1993).
13 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 13, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/10 (1999), para. 52.
14 SERF Index, available at www.serfindex.org/about/ (last visited 14 April 2016).
15 Landman, ‘Comparative Politics and Human Rights’, 24(4) HRQ (2002) 890; see also Landman, 
‘Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice and Policy’, 26 HRQ (2004) 906.
16 See, e.g., Backman et al., ‘Health Systems and the Right to Health: An Assessment of  194 Countries’, 
372(9655) The Lancet (2008) 2047.
17 Office of  the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Indicators: A  Guide to 
Measurement and Implementation (2012).
18 Ibid., at 17.
19 Ibid., at 67–68.
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indicators into four categories labelled A, B, C and D and considers A – indicators that 
are quantitative and objective – to be the most useful.20 Even where intrinsically sub-
jective phenomena are being measured, the preference is for quantitative data that 
might emerge through statistically representative surveys (one example being the 
‘percentage of  individuals who feel safe walking alone at night’).21 Where indicators 
based on expert judgment are to be used, they are to be coded in the first place in order 
to convert them into numbers or symbols that can be tabulated and counted.22
Second, in order to ‘concretize’ the content of  each right and make explicit the link 
between the normative standards of  a given right and its indicators, it was decided 
that attributes – usually around four in number – ought to be identified within each 
right. The aim was to provide a way to break down the many different rights in a way 
that facilitated the easy selection and measurement of  indicators. For the right to life, 
which is the main example given, these attributes were ‘arbitrary deprivation of  life’, 
‘disappearances of  individuals’, ‘health and nutrition’, and ‘death penalty’.23 The 
same approach, it was suggested, should be taken with all rights, drawing from all of  
the nine international human rights treaties to determine a handful of  attributes that 
could then be used as the basis on which indicators might be selected.24
Third, it was made clear that the framework ought to revolve around Avedis 
Donabedian’s model of  structure-process-outcome,25 which had originally been cre-
ated in order to evaluate the quality of  care in health services. The essential aim was 
to create a set of  structural, process and outcome indicators for each attribute of  each 
right, which would in effect measure a given state’s commitment, effort and results 
respectively. This process would help ‘unpackage the narrative on the normative con-
tent of  a right’, ‘demystify the notion of  human rights and take the human rights 
discourse beyond the confines of  legal and justice sector discussions’ and so on.26
The sample indicators on the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment serve as an illustration of  the OHCHR’s aim.27 As usual, the 
right is divided into a handful of  separate attributes: ‘Physical and mental integrity 
of  detained or imprisoned persons’, ‘[c]onditions of  detention’, ‘[u]se of  force by law 
enforcement officials outside detention’ and ‘[c]ommunity and domestic violence’. 
Each of  these has a common set of  structural indicators, which include ‘international 
human rights treaties relevant to the right … ratified by the State’, ‘[d]ate of  entry 
into force and coverage of  the right not to be tortured in the constitution or other 
forms of  superior law’ and ‘[d]ate of  entry into force and coverage of  domestic laws for 
implementing the right not to be tortured, including code of  conduct on medical trials 
20 Ibid., at 19.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., at 66.
23 OHCHR, Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of  Human Rights, UN 
Doc. HRI/MC/2008/3 (2008), para. 7.
24 Ibid.
25 See, e.g., Donabedian, ‘The Quality of  Care: How Can It Be Assessed?’, 260(12) Journal of  the American 
Medical Association (1988) 1743.
26 OHCHR, supra note 23, para. 9.
27 OHCHR, supra note 17, at 91.
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and scientific experimentation on human beings’. The indicators then become subdi-
vided into further structural, process and outcome indicators. Taking one of  the attri-
butes, ‘[c]ommunity and domestic violence’, a structural indicator is ‘[d]ate of  entry 
into force and coverage of  specific legislation on community and domestic violence’; 
a process indicator is ‘[p]roportion of  women reporting forms of  violence … against 
themselves or their children initiating legal action or seeking help from police or coun-
selling centres’ and an outcome indicator is ‘[i]ncidence and prevalence of  deaths and 
crimes related to community and domestic violence … in the reporting period’. For this 
single right, across the four attributes, there are 10 structural indicators, 19 process 
indicators and nine outcome indicators provided. This is broadly illustrative of  the 14 
rights that are examined in the guide.
The OHCHR’s approach has now begun to be adopted across the UN treaty bod-
ies, and the production of  indicators and the collection and disaggregation of  data 
with indicators in mind can only be expected to draw increasing time, attention and 
resources from governments, practitioners and academics alike. At the same time, 
however, there is a certain level of  resistance against the move towards indicators, not 
least from some members of  the treaty bodies themselves, who have been described 
as ‘lukewarm’.28 The quantitative measurement of  human rights has been viewed 
as being problematic almost since its inception,29 and just as the indicator project 
has gathered momentum, so have the concerns expressed about it. Indeed, it is rare 
to find an academic article written about the subject that has not acknowledged 
severe problems with, at the very least, the reliability of  statistics, data collection and 
disaggregation.30
More seriously, some scholars have seen in the project a shift in focus towards audit-
ing: a change in emphasis from judgment-based decision making to an exercise in 
verification and checking – in other words, a reconceptualization of  the role of  the 
treaty bodies away from the judgment-based, subjective assessments of  state parties’ 
performance and specific, contextual recommendations towards the objective evalu-
ation of  data collection methods and the verification of  outcomes. This brings with 
it the concern that monitoring through indicators ignores the complexity of  what 
human rights represent – that no level of  quantitative measurement or benchmark-
ing can displace the ‘pesky, irreducible core of  human judgment’ that must always be 
the final arbiter of  which policy is implemented, how resources are allocated and how 
choices are prioritized.31 That is to say, both the nature of  human rights monitoring 
and the nature of  human rights practice is highly dependent on context and, hence, 
28 S. Merry, Chapter  4: The Problem of  Human Rights Indicators (2012), at 46 (unpublished), available at 
www.law.uvic.ca/demcon/2012%20readings/Chapter%203%20Problem%20of%20HR%20indicators.
pdf  (last visited 25 March 2015).
29 See, e.g., Barsh, ‘Measuring Human Rights’, 15 HRQ (1993) 87.
30 See, e.g., the otherwise relatively uncritical articles by Felner, ‘A New Frontier in Economic and Social 
Rights Advocacy? Turning Quantitative Data into a Tool for Human Rights Accountability’, 5 Sur. 
Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos (2008) 109, at 131–132; de Beco, ‘Human Rights Indicators 
for Assessing State Compliance with International Human Rights’, 77 Nordic Journal of  International Law 
(2008) 23.
31 Rosga and Satterthwaite, ‘UN Indicators in Critical Perspective’, in Davis et al., supra note 3, 297.
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human judgment and expertise, and this cannot be replaced simply with the use of  
more and better indicators and benchmarks.
What explains the rise in the use of  indicators, despite these concerns? And why 
should proponents of  human rights view it with such caution? This article argues that 
all of  these questions can be answered by considering the move towards indicators as 
a project characterized by a propensity towards rationalism.
3 Oakeshott and Rationalism
Oakeshott defined rationalism by reference to a character – the rationalist. He describes 
this person as standing, at all times, for independent thought, free from obligation to 
any authority except for reason: ‘He believes … in the open mind, the mind free from 
prejudice and its relic, habit. He believes that the unhindered human “reason” … is 
an infallible guide in political activity.’32 This makes him, on the one hand, partially a 
sceptic because he never hesitates to subject any opinion, habit or belief  to the power 
of  his reason. He has no capacity or willingness to accept the ‘mysteries and uncer-
tainties of  experience’ or the traditional knowledge of  his society at face value. Yet, 
on the other hand, he is also an optimist: he has absolute faith in the power of  reason 
and rational argument to solve mankind’s problems through the pursuit of  univer-
sally valid answers.33 His political activity consists in bringing the ‘social, political, 
legal and institutional inheritance of  his society before the tribunal of  his intellect’ – a 
project of  innovation and construction; of  solving problems and scrubbing clear the 
tabula rasa of  the ‘irrational scribblings of  tradition-ridden ancestors’.34 Nothing is to 
be accepted merely because it exists or has existed for generations but only because it 
passes the test of  reason.
Oakeshott’s rationalism has a number of  different characteristics. First, it views 
all problems as being resolvable; it transforms the sphere of  political action from the 
open-ended and conversational to ‘something more like an argument, which demands 
a conclusion’.35 Politics is that of  ‘felt need’ – continuous resolution of  crises through 
the application of  reason.36 It is not a project of  making do or the careful amendment 
of  traditional rules and practices but, rather, the use of  rationality unclouded by ‘the 
fumes of  tradition’ to construct new rules, new inventions and new solutions.37 It is 
the politics of  the blank slate: a preference at all times for the well-reasoned solution 
based on abstract rationality over the messy but tried and tested.
Second, rationalism has within it what Oakeshott calls a ‘doctrine of  human knowl-
edge’, the result of  which (or perhaps the cause) is a preoccupation with certainty.38 
He examines this through an extended musing on knowledge and how it can be sorted 
32 Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, in M. Oakeshott (ed.), Rationalism in Politics (1962) 1, at 4.
33 Ibid., at 1–3.
34 Ibid., at 5.
35 Candreva, The Enemies of  Perfection (2005), at 28.
36 Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, supra note 32, at 5.
37 Ibid., at 4–7.
38 Ibid., at 7–13.
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into two separate categories that are akin to the ancient division between technē and 
epistēmē. That is, knowledge is generally divisible into two sorts: practical knowledge 
(knowledge that is generated by and contingent on practice) versus technical knowl-
edge or technique (knowledge that is formulated into rules). The difference is that 
which lies between the craft of  a chef  and the recipes contained in a cookery book or 
between the skill of  driving a car and the rules contained in the highway code. Nobody 
supposes that the knowledge a good cook has is confined to what can be contained 
in a book; he also has what Michael Polanyi would have referred to as ‘tacit knowl-
edge’ – what one has learned through practice (how different tastes combine, how 
much salt to add to a particular dish, how to replace ingredients with others and many 
unspoken rules of  thumb).39 Essentially, all human activities – driving, cooking, paint-
ing, writing poetry, science – are comprised, according to Oakeshott, of  both of  these 
types of  knowledge: the formal rules that must generally be learned and that compro-
mise technique, and the informal, experiential, tacit understanding of  the craftsman 
or practitioner. Moreover, the technical and practical can never be separated or used 
as a replacement for each other. Thus, a pianist acquires not only technique (how to 
read music and so forth) but also artistry; a chess-player learns style and insight a well 
as what the potential moves are; and a scientist acquires intuition about profitable 
avenues to explore as well as the theory of  his field.40
The rationalist, according to Oakeshott, believes that all real knowledge is technical 
knowledge and, therefore, that practical knowledge is not really knowledge at all – it is 
rather a ‘nescience, which would be negligible if  it were not positively mischievous’.41 
While practical knowledge seems imprecise and uncertain – a matter of  opinion – and 
therefore not to be trusted, technical knowledge is clear and absolute. The  rationalist 
therefore holds reason sovereign; he believes in the ‘sovereignty of  technique’. 
Concomitantly, he believes in certitude: technical knowledge gives the appearance of  
being certain, in that it is self-contained and not predicated on prior knowledge, preju-
dice, preconceptions – or traditions. In its certainty, it is complete and providing of  
‘order and distinctness’.42 It is the reduction of  the ‘tangle and variety of  experience’ 
to a ‘set of  principles’ that can be assessed upon rational grounds.43
Third, as a result of  both its capacity to provide final resolutions and its certainty, 
and likewise its scepticism of  tradition and its suspicion of  practical knowledge, 
rationalism tends to have as one of  its goals the purging of  habit and prior prejudice. 
Since technical knowledge has the appearance of  being self-contained, and since the 
rationalist believes in the supremacy of  technical knowledge, other forms of  knowl-
edge can be ignored. Indeed, this is desirable to avoid being governed by ‘nescience’. 
In other words, the rationalist expects and desires certainty, believes that technical 
knowledge is the only kind of  knowledge that can provide it and, hence, requires the 
39 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958).
40 Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, supra note 32, at 7–13.
41 Ibid., at 11.
42 Ibid., at 6.
43 Ibid.
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expurgation of  anything that may hinder it – like the desire of  Voltaire to have good 
laws by burning all existing laws and starting afresh.44 Thus, the rationalist, as well 
as viewing problems as being permanently resolvable, also believes in the certainty of  
technical knowledge to provide such resolutions and, as a result, believes in the scrub-
bing out of  what comes before it.
Readers sometimes come to the conclusion that Oakeshott is developing some-
thing of  a straw man in his portrayal of  the rationalist45 (or, worse, is simply using 
the figure as a kind of  stand-in for socialists, progressives or liberals).46 Others view 
his theories as being outdated – a reaction against the world in which Oakeshott lived, 
with its recent history of  domineering ideologies and its reformative, progressive post-
war fervour.47 Others still construe his position as being nihilistic – a refutation of  
reason itself.48 However, Oakeshott was keen to emphasize that rationalism was not 
merely a phenomenon of  the era in which he was living and writing. This is because, 
far from referring specifically to a doctrine or a philosophy, Oakeshott’s description of  
the  rationalist is really a personification of  a certain conception of  knowledge.49 His 
essay is not to be understood, then, as a polemic against a certain class of  people or 
ideas but, rather, against a certain method of  thinking. It is a propensity rather than 
a person. Moreover, it is a propensity present in everyone and everything. In politics, 
rationalism has ‘come to colour the ideas, not merely of  one, but of  all political per-
suasions, and to flow over every party line’, and it is discernable in all fields of  human 
activity.50 At the same time, however, it is nowhere absolute or complete, and the pro-
pensity can only ever be partially embraced – the rationalist is a non-existent extreme. 
Or, rather, ‘the Rationalist is no-one, and yet he is everyone’.51 Oakeshott’s critique is 
not of  a person, a political persuasion or a movement but, rather, of  a tendency that 
we all share to some degree or other. Oakeshott’s description of  the rationalist and 
rationalism provides us with a compelling account for the international human rights 
system’s move towards the use of  indicators, as the next section makes clear.
4 The Propensity to Rationalism in the Indicator Project
The rationalist character of  the use of  indicators to measure human rights performance 
is uncontroversial, if  we use the word ‘rational’ in its ordinary meaning. Indeed, it seems 
unlikely that any of  those engaged in the advocacy or production of  indicators would 
disagree. The language of  the OHCHR is of  systematization, objectivity and science, 
and a prominent recent volume on the measurement of  human rights is almost explicit 
44 Ibid., at 5.
45 See, e.g., Kettler ‘The Cheerful Discourses of  Michael Oakeshott’, 16 World Politics (1964) 483, at 488.
46 See, e.g., citations in Candreva, supra note 35, n. 3, 4, 5.
47 See, e.g., Franco, ‘Review of  The Politics of  Faith and the Politics of  Skepticism’, 91 American Political Science 
Review (APSR) (1997) 439.
48 See, e.g., Berns, ‘Rationalism in Politics (Review)’, 57(3) APSR (1963) 670.
49 Candreva, supra note 35, at 53.
50 Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, supra note 32, at 6.
51 Gee and Webber, ‘Rationalism in Public Law’, 76(4) Modern Law Review (2013) 708, at 712.
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in stating the case for a neutral, empirical approach that sets to one side foundational, 
philosophical or normative concerns.52 Using the term in its dictionary meaning, the 
approach is self-consciously rational or purportedly so.
Oakeshott’s rationalism, however, has certain important characteristics. He did not 
simply mean by ‘rationalism’ to refer to anything that purported to be objective or 
scientific. He was referring to a more specific mode of  thinking that was constructed 
around the use of  reason unfiltered by tradition or habit to provide resolutions to 
problems and ‘felt needs’; the preoccupation with certainty, finality and uniformity 
that comes from the sovereignty of  technique; and the desire to expurgate prior preju-
dice and override the practical, traditional and experiential. It is the application of  
abstract and universal technical knowledge to any and all problems – or the use of  
premeditated principles to arrange a political community.53 Put this way, the move 
towards indicators clearly has something of  the character of  Oakeshottian rational-
ism about it.
In the first instance, and most prosaically, the use of  statistical indicators can cer-
tainly be conceptualized as the application of  technical knowledge to a single, big, 
perceived problem – what Landman and Edzia Carvalho refer to as the ‘large and vari-
able gap between the expectations for human dignity outlined through human rights 
standards and the reality of  the precariousness of  those rights as they are variously 
enjoyed around the world’.54 That is, there is one large and pressing issue in the field of  
international human rights law – the disparity between agreed obligations and actual 
performance – and this can be resolved, it is argued, by the use of  objective measure-
ment. As Judith Welling puts it, in a passage that neatly summarizes this view:
By improving the accuracy and comprehensiveness of  data relating to the status quo, interna-
tional indicators assist states parties in better understanding the current situation ... By pro-
viding feedback on the outcomes of  state policy, international indicators can inform decision 
making and suggest areas for future policy change at the governmental level … Illuminating the 
current conditions will thus help state members to better understand the consequences of  their 
policy decisions as well as how they might improve their ability to satisfy ESCR commitments.55
That is, objective measures supposedly allow for making objective judgments about 
progress, which can only be to the good since it will provide information on what has 
been achieved and what remains to be achieved and, thus, equip relevant parties with 
the necessary knowledge to make progress. A set of  other advantages logically follow 
from this given and are summarized in Landman and Carvalho’s book as allowing 
contextual description and documentation, classifying and categorization, monitoring 
of  compliance, mapping and pattern recognition, secondary analysis and advocacy.56 
Such advantages would all have the general ancillary benefit of  making the work of  
the monitoring bodies more efficient and streamlined.57 Many of  these benefits are 
52 Landman and Carvalho, Measuring Human Rights (2010), at 1.
53 See Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, in Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, supra note 32, 111.
54 Landman and Carvalho, supra note 52.
55 Welling, supra note 10, at 944.
56 See Landman and Carvalho, supra note 52, at 4–5.
57 See Welling, supra note 10, at 942.
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mentioned in the OHCHR guidelines,58 and it is not unusual to see advocated in the lit-
erature a fostering of  a ‘culture of  statistics’ within the international human rights sys-
tem in general, with many of  these benefits in mind.59 Even where scepticism is raised 
about the possibility of  measuring human rights performance empirically, and the 
underlying assumptions behind the production of  indicators, there usually remains a 
sense that what are needed are simply better indicators used in different ways.
The usefulness of  indicators in this respect, however, is even greater from a purpo-
sive perspective. Indicators ‘link the conceptual discussion about human rights com-
pliance to implementation practices’.60 They do not merely measure human rights 
compliance in the abstract; they also instigate movement in pre-determined directions 
and supply ready-made policy goals. Implicit in any indicator is a final destination or, 
at the very least, a direction of  travel. The indicator ‘proportion of  women reporting 
forms of  violence … against themselves or their children initiating legal action or seek-
ing help from police or counselling centres’ has within it an implied goal of  improving 
this proportion and the ultimate target of  increasing it to 100 per cent. However, it 
also readily lends itself  to benchmarks – increasing the proportion from 5 per cent 
to 10 per cent and so on – and, indeed, the OHCHR guide makes great play of  bench-
marking not merely in human rights monitoring but also in the performance moni-
toring of  development programs and government policy interventions as a whole. The 
use of  human rights indicators in governance, then, is not merely a method of  mea-
suring compliance but also a measure of  building certain human rights targets and 
goals – and, indeed, norms – into government policy. For human rights advocates, this 
is clearly something that is intrinsically desirable.
At the same time, indicators imply the existence of  ideals.61 The World Bank 
makes their normative character explicit: ‘In a sense, they are also communica-
tive instruments.’62 They are not merely data but also statements of  what is desir-
able, which means that they can express values: the adoption of  a set of  universal 
indicators ‘would be a high-profile reinforcement of  the claim that those human 
rights set out in international law are indeed universal’.63 This gives indicators a 
certain political usefulness. Human rights indicators, especially if  standardized 
and universalized, give substance to the normative position that human rights are 
available to all individuals on the basis of  interrelatedness, interdependence and 
indivisibility.64 But, of  course, individual indicators also have a normative func-
tion in expressing not only a purportedly empirical measure of  compliance or 
58 See OHCHR, supra note 17.
59 See, e.g., Thede, ‘Human Rights and Statistics: Some Reflections on the No-Man’s Land between Concept 
and Indicator’, 18 Statistical Journal of  the United Nations (2001) 259, at 271.
60 S. McInerney-Lankford and H.  Sano (eds), World Bank Study: Human Rights Indicators in Development 
(2010), at 14.
61 Kingsbury, ‘Introductory Remarks: Panel on Indicators in International Law’, 106 American Society of  
International Law Proceedings (2012) 243, at 243.
62 McInerney-Lankford and Sano, supra note 60 (emphasis in original).
63 Raworth, ‘Measuring Human Rights’, in S. Gruskin et al. (eds), Perspectives on Health and Human Rights 
(2005) 393, at 403.
64 See, e.g., OHCHR, supra note 17, at 10.
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performance regarding a certain right but also a vision of  what that right ought 
to mean and what its functions ought to be. The indicator ‘proportion of  women 
reporting forms of  violence … against themselves or their children initiating legal 
action or seeking help from police or counselling centres’, for instance, makes a 
clear statement about the content of  the right being measured. It makes explicit 
that this right is not merely concerned with the traditional focus on the judiciary 
and the criminal justice system but also includes the prevention or punishment 
of  domestic violence. It also makes explicit, through a structural indicator, that 
specific legislation on community and domestic violence is a desirable mechanism 
for doing so. Irrespective of  whether this interpretation is to be welcomed, it illus-
trates the power of  an indicator to make statements about the width and scope of  a 
given right. Of  course, this can be done as much through state-specific indicators 
as it is through universal ones, though it may be noted that the setting of  ‘attri-
butes’ by the OHCHR has much of  this character. In defining the attributes of  a 
given right, the  OHCHR is not merely expressing empirically what it considers the 
nature of  that right to be but is also implicitly including and excluding areas of  
public and private life from its scope.
It is apt, then, to think of  the indicator project as being a response to a set of  ‘felt 
needs’ – whether they are for more information and measurement per se, for the goal 
of  human rights ‘mainstreaming’ in policy and budgeting generally, for clarification 
and elaboration on the nature and content of  rights or, indeed, for expressing norma-
tive values. In turn, these serve the larger felt need of  bringing states’ behaviour in line 
with their obligations and of  expressing certain standards and ideals. Moreover, it is a 
response that attaches great importance to the rationalist principles of  certainty and 
uniformity.
Of  course, no UN body has taken the view that a universal standardized set of  indicators 
that applies always and everywhere is required. While the OHCHR’s stated position is that 
the ‘core content’ of  human rights ought to be monitored through the use of  universal 
indicators, its desire is not for a complete and concrete suite of  indicators for every single 
human right in every single state party to every treaty.65 Yet while there may never be a 
complete set of  universal indicators, it is nonetheless the case that what has been advocated 
is the universal use of  indicators and a universal framework guiding their use. Uniformity 
and certainty, in other words, manifest themselves not at the level of  direct implementa-
tion but, rather, at the level of  conceptualization – it is in the overarching structure of  the 
international human rights system in which uniformity and certainty appear.
The desire for certainty most clearly finds its expression in the emphasis on objectiv-
ity. As Sally Engle Merry puts it, much of  the power of  indicators lies in their capacity 
to ‘convert complicated contextually variable phenomena into unambiguous, clear, 
and impersonal measures’.66 The objective transforms the nebulous into the concrete. 
65 See OHCHR, Report on Indicators for Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights 
Instruments, 18th Meeting of  Chairpersons of  the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/
MC/2006/7 (2006), para. 28.
66 Merry, ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance’, 52(3) Current 
Anthropology (2011) 583, at 584.
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Much of  the indicator literature advances the argument that all forms of  data – quali-
tative and quantitative, subjective and objective – are in some respect mutually rein-
forcing, but there is generally an implied or express preference for the quantitative 
and the objective. While qualitative and quantitative data may be viewed as comple-
mentary, the qualitative and the subjective is often represented as being in some sense 
inferior in usefulness, primarily because it is lacking in certainty and, thus, in need 
of  reformulating in such a way that it can be numerically measured – repackaged so 
the subjective becomes less so. The OHCHR’s guide, with its four quadrants of  indi-
cators ranked A–D, puts this most starkly, but a similar implicit hierarchy is present 
elsewhere – for instance, in Gauthier de Beco’s 2008 article, which seems to place 
household perception data below socio-economic data and events-based data in terms 
of  its usefulness for monitoring human rights performance and places expert judg-
ments lowest of  all,67 or Craig Mokhiber’s desire to bring subjective measures within 
the rubric of  data such as opinion polls and other more ‘objective’ measures of  pub-
lic confidence.68 As well as being more accurate and clear, a crucial element cited as 
an advantage of  using quantitative indicators is that they provide consistency. Unlike 
the subjective opinion of  an expert, an indicator allows close tracking of  performance 
over time, permitting the accurate assessment of  improvement or failure.69
Yet the desire for uniformity and certainty also manifest themselves as broader 
guiding principles, both within the initial impetus towards the wider use of  indicators 
and their continuing expansion. Obviously, the OHCHR’s efforts are straightforwardly 
an attempt to systematize and universalize the production and use of  indicators – if  
not to achieve uniformity at the level of  individual indicators used, then to achieve it 
in the form of  a ‘common approach’.70 However, there is also an aspect of  the drive 
towards indicators that seeks not merely to measure but also to map; if  not to defini-
tively set out in concrete terms where the limits of  each right lie and what their respec-
tive characteristics are, then at least to rationalize the process by which this could be 
determined.
5 The Consequences of  the Rationalist Propensity
The indicator project, then, can be aptly described as possessing a strong propensity 
towards rationalism. This analysis now turns to the potential consequent pernicious 
effects that, indeed, have been identified by scholars who are sceptical of  the move to 
indicators. The first of  these – the production of  unintended consequences – is obvious 
and something that Oakeshott dealt with briefly. This is not the concern that rational-
ist endeavours will necessarily result in bad outcomes (although this certainly may 
67 de Beco, supra note 30, at 34–38.
68 Mokhiber, ‘Toward a Measure of  Dignity: Indicators for Rights-Based Development’ Conference on 
Statistics, Development and Human Rights, International Association for Official Statistics, 2000.
69 See Malhotra and Fasel, ‘Quantitative Human Rights Indicators: A Survey of  Major Initiatives’ Expert 
Meeting on Human Rights Indicators, Turku, Finland, March 2005, available at www.gaportal.org/sites/
default/files/Quantitative%20Human%20Rights%20Indicators.pdf  (last visited 14 April 2016).
70 OHCHR, supra note 17, at 30.
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be the case71), but it is rather that, being weighted towards only half  of  the available 
sphere of  knowledge (the technical), rationalist projects can only at best be half  right. 
Therefore, they must result in unforeseen effects. While Oakeshott did not use this lan-
guage, he was clearly alluding to something similar to Robert Merton’s ‘unanticipated 
consequences of  purposive social action’72 – a theme that scholars have subsequently 
teased out of  Oakeshott’s work.73 That is to say, an approach that is at best half  right 
will also be at best half  wrong and often in such a way that its proponents cannot 
recognize.
Unanticipated consequences must manifest themselves in the indicator project 
because both the measured and the users of  measures have the tendency to change 
their behaviour as a result of  the measurement concerned. Measures ‘create social 
worlds’ by causing people to think and act differently.74 Michael Power, in his work 
on auditing, divided such reactions into decoupling and colonization. In the first 
instance, there is a strong incentive for the subjects of  an audit to attempt to render 
the process ‘ceremonial’ – to produce comfort in the auditing body through ritualized 
compliance and the production of  ‘auditable form’ rather than actual substance.75 In 
other words, states may simply ‘buffer away’ the monitoring process by going through 
an ineffectual, but apparently exhaustive, set of  checking and measurement, issuing 
of  technical guidance, production of  measures and metrics and so forth.76 As Power 
argues, while such efforts can never be completely successful, they shift the focus 
away from the proper moral concern (in the case of  human rights, the protection of  
individual human beings) to something altogether more abstract and ultimately often 
meaningless: the creation of  auditable outputs to satisfy external monitors as an end 
in itself.77 To this might be added the opportunity cost of  diverting resources and time 
towards the creation of  auditable performance (indicators, standards, measures and 
associated data collection and disaggregation) as opposed to the actual protection of  
individual citizens’ human rights.
In the second approach, precisely the opposite concern is that the values and prac-
tices of  audit permeate an organization – or a state – to such an extent that it creates 
new mentalities, new strategies and new goals that interact in hitherto unknowable or 
unpredictable ways. Actors change their behaviour and activities in the name of  these 
new values, and they do so in complex ways that may result in unintended and undesir-
able outcomes. Power uses the example of  the Research Assessment Exercise in United 
71 See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 29; S. Morse, Indices and Indicators in Development: An Unhealthy Obsession with 
Numbers (2004); Bhuta, ‘Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of  State Fragility and the Calculability 
of  Political Order’, in Davis et al., supra note 3, 132, at 147–149.
72 Merton, ‘The Unanticiated Consequences of  Purposive Social Action’, 1(6) American Sociological Review 
(1936) 894.
73 See, e.g., Teles and Kaliner, ‘The Public Policy of  Skepticism’, 2(1) Perspectives on Politics (2004) 39.
74 Espeland and Stevens, ‘Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds’, 113 
American Journal of  Sociology (2007) 1.
75 M. Power, The Audit Society (1997), at 96.
76 See also Meyer and Rowan, ‘Institutionalised Organisations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’, in 
W. Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (1991) 41.
77 Power, supra note 75, at 121.
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Kingdom (UK) universities, which caused academics to prefer publishing in journals 
to books and to prefer not to spend time doing activities that were not measured, such 
as editing books and reviewing publications.78 While these effects are not catastrophic 
for higher education or research in the UK, they are certainly different from what was 
desired or intended. We can expect similarly unpredictable effects to take place wherever 
an audit takes place, with the danger not that they are necessarily negative but, rather, 
that they are unknown and unknowable ex ante.
As Power puts it, decoupling and compartmentalization are inevitable because indi-
viduals are ‘infinitely more complex and adaptable than normalizing attempts to mea-
sure and control them’,79 but at the same time, colonization through auditing must 
also always be expected, because motivations will always tend to become aligned with 
targets. At its worst, this produces an indicator culture that simply creates a game-
playing mentality for the audited and ‘reverse effects’, in which the production of  
auditable performance actually undermines the initial aim.80
Of  greater concern to Oakeshott, however, was that the twin desires of  the rational-
ist – for, on the one hand, uniformity and certainty and, on the other, the application 
of  principle distilled from experience – would diminish and displace discourse; that 
they would close conversation through the application of  reason to finding the best or 
correct course. And, indeed, this danger is immanent in the human rights indicator 
project. In the first place, if  the content of  rights has been determined through attri-
butes, and delineated through specific indicators, then there must be a chilling and 
finalizing effect on conversation and dialogue. For if  a set of  indicators and attributes 
defines a given right’s content, then what need is there to discuss alternative visions 
of  that right? There are merely numerical measures by which to assess performance. 
This, indeed, was foremost among Oakeshott’s concerns. Whereas unintended conse-
quences are almost mentioned as an aside, he was particularly anxious that the aim 
of  rationalist projects was to provide finality and certainty rather than a continual 
making do.
The capacity for indicators to reduce and close off  conversation has been widely 
acknowledged. Ann-Janette Rosga and Margaret Satterthwaite, for instance, identify 
the dangers associated with internationally agreed indicators ‘artificially [closing] 
the gap between international law and domestic policy’, whereby national political 
discourse and contestation about rights is simply bypassed through the manifesta-
tion of  apparently neutral and objective indicators, agreed in supra-national fora, in 
domestic policy.81 Indeed, the OHCHR’s guide is explicit about this in its advocacy of  
the introduction of  indicators into national human rights action plans, development 
strategies and budgeting.82 National budgets being fixed in line with internationally 
agreed targets, whether one agrees with a given target or not, indisputably terminates 
or sublimates political conversation surrounding the use of  public funds.
78 Ibid., at 100.
79 Ibid., at 120
80 Ibid.
81 Rosga and Satterthwaite, supra note 31, at 308.
82 OHCHR, supra note 17, at 103–132.
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Yet in a sense, the closing-off  of  dialogue and conversation is a much more subtle 
and pervasive process, associated not with the outright and absolute introduction 
of  human rights indicators wholesale into domestic policy but, rather, with the cre-
ation of  a technique of  global governance, to paraphrase Benedict Kingsbury and col-
leagues. It has been persuasively suggested that indicators are part of  what Nikolas 
Rose refers to as a method of  ‘governing at a distance’83 – a representation of  how 
political power becomes reconfigured so as to provide for the autonomy of  individual 
actors while, at the same time, governing their conduct through supposedly neutral 
measures – ‘the instrumentalization of  a regulated autonomy’.84 Governing at a dis-
tance, in other words, is governance that does not regulate actors directly but, rather, 
attempts to link their behaviour to political objectives and is particularly useful – or, 
indeed, crucial – where systems are decentralized. Indicators in the sphere of  interna-
tional human rights, it seems, are a mechanism for achieving this. They allow state 
actors to have autonomy within a largely decentralized system while, at the same 
time, aligning their behaviour towards certain political goals (that is, predetermined 
conceptions of  human rights) through the use of  apparently apolitical measures and 
standards.85
Thus, the cloak of  neutrality is of  particular usefulness to the marketing of  indica-
tors. It is precisely because they depoliticize what would otherwise be highly contested 
choices that they are most useful. As Rosga and Sattherthwaite point out, indicators 
purport to offer technical answers to what would otherwise be extremely difficult ques-
tions, and this makes indicators presentable as a kind of  neutral exercise that ought 
to be voluntarily accepted, rather than an assertion of  authority and power.86 This is 
useful in securing voluntary compliance on the part of  what are commonly referred to 
as ‘human rights stakeholders’ and in persuading states to submit to the supervision 
of  treaty bodies and the OHCHR on the basis that this supervision is merely technical 
and therefore non-threatening. However, by extension, this can only have the effect, 
and, indeed, is often designed to have the effect, of  removing human rights from the 
sphere of  domestic conversation and debate, which, in turn, distances human rights 
from the very stakeholders who have most at stake – ordinary citizens.87
The language and mentality of  auditing reinforces this denuding of  discourse. For 
debate is not, of  course, entirely ended by the adoption and creation of  indicators. 
Rather, much remains to be discussed both in their creation and in the application 
of  the broader conceptual framework. But this discussion, taking place as it does 
away from domestic politics in the realm of  international experts and technicians, 
submerges political questions in technical arguments surrounding how and what 
83 See, e.g., Davis et al., ‘Indicators as a Technology of  Global Governance’, 46(1) Law and Society Review 
(2012) 71, at 81.
84 See Rose, ‘Governing “Advanced” Liberal Democracies’, reproduced in P. Miller and N. Rose, Governing the 
Present (2008) 199, at 212–213.
85 On this point, see also Satterthwaite, ‘Indicators in Crisis: Rights-Based Humanitarian Indicators in Post-
Earthquake Haiti’, 43 New York University Journal of  International Law and Politics (2010) 865.
86 Rosga and Sattherthwaite, supra note 31, at 311.
87 See, e.g., Felner, supra note 30, at 133–134.
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to measure, how to collect data and so forth.88 While political considerations are 
immanent in the process, they are left unexplored. Moreover, because quantitative 
measurement produces a sense of  definitiveness and objective reality in the indica-
tors it produces, it conceals the underlying socio-political claims the indicators may 
represent.89 That is, in deciding what to include or exclude in a given indicator, the 
producer is making decisions, implicitly, about what is or is not desirable, and such 
a decision can only be a political, value-based process, especially in a field such as 
human rights. Depoliticizing what would ordinarily be politically contested, through 
the application of  technical standards, may provide a sense of  neutrality and objec-
tivity, but it is a false sense. It removes socio-political values from the public realm 
and embeds them in the construction of  indicators, which shifts the balance of  power 
towards the experts engaged in that process.90 The scope of  influence of  politicians 
and politics is correspondingly reduced, and the focus moves away from the ethical 
towards manner – from content to form.91
Thus, technique replaces the difficult process of  moral and political education that 
Oakeshott held so important: ‘The morality of  the Rationalist is the morality of  the self-con-
scious pursuit of  moral ideals, and the appropriate form of  moral education is by precept, 
by the presentation and explanation of  moral principles.’92 This can be seen very clearly in 
the way in which indicators are intended to transform the administration of  human rights 
law at the domestic level into, essentially, an exercise in discourse-free checking. Once 
the indicators have been agreed, human rights performance can apparently be assessed 
 objectively, with quantitative improvements across the various metrics demonstrating 
that compliance is taking place and the human rights situation is improving. The ques-
tions of  whether it actually is improving, and what this means, are sublimated beneath the 
auditing process, but, more importantly, so are questions of  morality and the field of  moral 
education. Rather than the slow, flexible evolution of  the moral traditions and habits of  a 
community through political conversation, there is instead simply the blunt application 
of  the precept. Rather than a concept of  a given right developing organically within the 
society in question, there is instead the displacement of  localized rights and rights dia-
logue,93 and the suffocation of  local idioms.94 Instead of  injustice being framed around the 
individual, it is framed around the failure to perform against targets or the mere failure to 
produce auditable performance itself. Instead of  being a discourse about establishing what 
is right and wrong – or just – in given cases or in a given policy, the matter of  enshrining 
and protecting human rights instead becomes a task for management.95
88 See Merry, supra note 66, at 588.
89 See Davis et al., supra note 83, at 87.
90 Ibid.
91 See Jacobsson, ‘Standardization and Expert Knowledge’, in N. Brunsson and B. Jacobsson (eds), A World 
of  Standards (2002) 41, at 46–48.
92 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, supra note 32, at 35.
93 See, e.g., Mazzone, ‘The Rise and Fall of  Human Rights: A Sceptical Account of  Multilevel Governance’, 
3(1) Cambridge Journal of  International and Comparative Law (2014) 929.
94 See, e.g., Hafner-Burton and Ron, ‘Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and 
Quantitative Eyes’, 61(2) World Politics (2009) 360, at 393–394.
95 See Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of  Legal 
Education’, 1 European Journal of  Legal Studies (2010) 1.
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Ultimately, this also has the effect – and, as has been often seen, the stated intention – 
of  diminishing the role of  the subjective, experiential and practical in the protection 
of  human rights and the assessment of  its performance. It represents the reduction, 
as Oakeshott put it, of  ‘the tangle and variety of  experience to a set of  principles’.96 
The rationalist view of  experience is a limiting one. It accepts only experience that has 
been converted into a formula, not the wider sense of  experience cumulating within a 
society into traditions and habits that, though mysterious or opaque, contain its accu-
mulated practical knowledge. This leads the rationalist to cut himself  off  from tradi-
tion and, in turn, become ‘apt to attribute to mankind a necessary inexperience in all 
the critical moments of  life’;97 to paternalistically ignore local and contextual wisdom 
in the name of  certain and uniform objective measurement – to seek to extract knowl-
edge from its context and its history.98 The power of  indicators to reduce and submerge 
the complexities of  contextual phenomena into standards and categories is a ready 
example of  the capacity for rationalism to act in this way, as is the reduction of  subjec-
tive, expert narrative into quasi-objective measures through coding into numerical 
representations or through the reduction of  lived experience to survey data, which 
transforms the rich tapestry and complexity of  communities and individuals into 
quantitative measures such as ‘percentage of  individuals who feel safe walking alone 
at night’. It is the imposition of  the simplicity of  principles onto the ‘tangle and vari-
ety’ of  lived experience. It is to ignore how matters are currently ‘attended to’ and, 
instead, to approach matters as a social engineer.99
Removing moral discourse from the sphere of  human rights and driving it into ‘what 
is measurable instead of  what matters’ then has the effect of  depriving the human rights 
movement of  its power as a mechanism for justice, and diminishing its potential by focusing 
on what is measurement friendly.100 The unpredictable, ungovernable, chaotic nature of  
changing social norms, which may seem dormant for decades before undergoing dramatic 
shifts, is lost amid the need to demonstrate structure, process and outcome. Denuding the 
human rights movement of  discourse by shifting the emphasis towards verification and 
auditing strips away its political power. The end result is the draining away of  its spirit. 
Instead of  Immanuel Kant’s moral politician, the ‘genuine republican’ seeking to act in the 
right way based on the context of  the society in which he lived, there is instead simply the 
development and application of  professional technique.101 Instead of  narrative, the telling 
of  stories ‘that keep alive and strengthen the ideas of  freedom, equality and universality’, 
there is a managerial sensibility that sees its role as the verification of  performance towards 
outcomes agreed among a caste of  international experts, rather than justice.102
96 Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, supra note 32, at 2.
97 Ibid., at 3.
98 Merry, ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance’, 52 Current Anthropology 
(2011) 84.
99 See Oakeshott, ‘Scientific Politics’, 1 Cambridge Journal (1947–1948) 347, at 355.
100 ICHRP, supra note 2, at 4.
101 Koskenniemi, supra note 95.
102 ICHRP, supra note 2, at 3, describing how donors typically adopt the view that human rights practitioners 
have ‘too broad a justice perspective’.
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6 The Transformation from Tool to Paradigm
Yet most advocates of  the use of  quantitative data in the measurement of  human rights 
see a continued role for the subjective and experiential complemented by the use of  indi-
cators. The OHCHR’s guide itself  describes indicators as a ‘tool to support’ narrative or 
judicial assessments, and this perspective is fairly common.103 As Nancy Thede describes it, 
the majority ‘see the usefulness of  a combination of  analysis and quantified data, the latter 
being a useful complement to the former but never under any circumstances being able to 
stand on its own.’104 And there are, indeed, alternative visions for the use of  indicators that 
suggest how the technical knowledge provided by statistical measures can supplement the 
intuitive and tacit practical knowledge of  the practitioner, rather than supplant it.
An extensive example of  such a process is provided by Christopher Stone in the form 
of  ‘locally usable near real time “active indicators”’, used by the Jamaican Constabulary 
Force to mine data regarding raids and searches in order to establish best practices, or by 
the Attorney General of  Lagos State to establish how many prisoners were on pre-trial 
detention in prisons and for how long in order to focus resources on the elimination of  
bottlenecks.105 Here, quantitative data in the form of  indicators is used in a decentralized 
fashion by local professionals and experts to notice patterns and find hidden discrepancies 
or misallocations of  resources in order to improve their work. Stone contrasts this with 
the many ‘carcasses of  failed indicator projects’ littering developed countries – the results 
of  resistance to the exercising of  external power on the part of  local agencies (‘those in 
positions of  immediate and legitimate authority’, as Stone puts it) and of  constant shift-
ing priorities forced by new indicators demanded by governmental ministers, donors or 
UN agencies.106 Rather, Stone describes the use in Jamaica and Lagos of  indicators that 
are designed specifically for use by an official with formal authority over those expected to 
produce the outcome being measured – for instance, the commissioner of  the Jamaican 
Constabulary Force.107 This design enables close, responsive, timely measurement for a 
clear purpose, improving the effectiveness and efficiency of  police raids and, crucially, 
ensuring that data is examined at the level of  operational responsibility by those in posi-
tions of  legitimate authority, not national or international figures who are far away from 
the actual practice in question (both literally and figuratively) and who lack accountabil-
ity and, hence, legitimacy in the eyes of  those working ‘on the ground’. Other examples 
from the Philippines and Colombia demonstrate how human rights indicators can be 
developed and used locally, even when they are created in response to international stan-
dards or principles, to provide information about local needs.108
103 OHCHR, supra note 17, at 4.
104 Thede, supra note 59, at 270.
105 Stone, ‘Problems of  Power in the Design of  Indicators of  Safety and Justice in the Global South’, in Davis 
et al., supra note 3, 282.
106 Ibid., at 281–283.
107 Ibid., at 285.
108 See Santos, Decentralisation and Human Rights: A  Philippine Perspective on the Feasibility of  Their 
Interface in Policy and Practice, International Council on Human Rights Policy Working Paper (2001), 
available at www.ichrp.org/files/papers/39/116_-_The_Philippines_-_Linking_Local_Government_
and_Human_Rights_Santos__Soliman__2001.pdf  (accessed 14 April 2016); Urueña, ‘Internally 
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These, it seems, could be examples of  Oakeshott’s description of  the combination 
of  the technical and the practical made real: the tacit, intuitive, experiential nature 
of  the practitioner supported and enhanced by the application of  statistical tools in 
a bottom-up, contextual process carried out at the most decentralized level possible 
– and the approach certainly holds promise in the field of  human rights. Given this 
possibility, then, it seems churlish, even disingenuous, to describe the move towards 
indicators as being in danger of  crowding out less technical methods of  monitoring 
human rights. Construed as simply being supplementary to, and supportive of, judg-
ment-based, subjective assessments, where is the harm in an increased use of  indica-
tors, moderated by common sense?
The danger is that the rationalist tendency is always at risk of  becoming dominant. 
Perhaps the greatest concern is simply that the desire for ever greater acquisition of  
technique will accelerate and that it will consequently come to subvert the experiential, 
practical knowledge, analysis and assessments of  the locally embedded expert. Despite 
best intentions – in other words, despite human rights practitioners taking the view 
that quantitative measures and indicators are simply complementary to human judg-
ment about how to best protect human rights in a given context – it may be that the 
rationalist tendency will nonetheless turn monstrous (not least because of  financial 
considerations, which will always prioritize measureable ‘impact’). Merry describes in 
compelling terms how, at the treaty body level, ‘indicator culture’ has come to be the 
default mode of  monitoring human rights performance,109 and in the UK, the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission’s work has come to revolve heavily around the use of  
indicators in a ‘measurement framework’.110 At a recent workshop organized by the 
International Council on Human Rights Policy, the participants expressed the concern 
that ‘evaluation methods and frames of  impact assessment [are] exerting a dispro-
portionate pressure on the narratives and practices of  human rights work, distorting 
priorities, objectives and processes’.111 Or, as Paul Gready puts it, ‘[f]or human rights, 
there is a real danger that its reference point may shift too radically from international 
human rights law to the requirements of  evaluation and donors’.112
Why should this be so? Oakeshott’s final, and most pressing, concern was that 
 rationalism would perpetuate itself  – that the field of  morality and moral education 
would become more and more a matter of  the acquisition of  technique – primarily 
because of  the view the rationalist had towards practical knowledge. Since he saw it as 
being inferior to technical knowledge, he begins to neglect it, if  not to attempt actively 
to extirpate it. And because of  this, he ‘dries up [his] mind’ – he sees the only solutions 
to perceived problems as the application of  yet more technique: ‘All the Rationalist can 
Displaced Population in Colombia: A Case Study on the Domestic Aspects of  Indicators as Technologies 
of  Global Governance’, in Davis et al., supra note 3, 249.
109 Merry, supra note 28.
110 Equality and Human Rights Commission, available at www.equalityhumanrights.com/about-us/our-
work/key-projects/equality-measurement-framework (last visited 25 March 2015).
111 ICHRP supra note 2, at 3.
112 Gready, ‘Reasons to Be Cautious about Evidence and Evaluation: Rights based Approaches to Development 
and the Emerging Culture of  Evaluation’, 1(3) Journal of  Human Rights Practice (2009) 380, at 383.
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do when left to himself  is to replace one rationalist project in which he has failed by 
another in which he hopes to succeed’.113 The political content of  human rights – the 
goal of  justice for the individual against the power of  the State – becomes stripped 
away by the need for better measurement and better performance based on what can 
be measured.114
The concern, then, is not that anybody advocates for the replacement of  judge-
ment-based assessment by the use of  purely objective-seeming statistical measures, 
indicators and benchmarks. Rather, it is that the rationalist propensity sees the resolu-
tion of  problems as purely being a matter for the application of  technique, rather than 
for the more difficult, time-consuming and decentralized – uncontrolled – method of  
developing practical knowledge. Instead of  the slow, steady, quiet evolution of  moral 
principle and of  the tacit, experiential knowledge of  the expert, the default position 
becomes that quantitative measurement provides the cure for all ills. Once the cul-
ture of  statistics and indicators enters the mainstream, it becomes difficult to reverse. 
Where practical knowledge is seen as ‘nescience’, the only solutions postulated will 
be technical in nature, and the only cure for rationalist failures will be more rational-
ism. And this describes with great accuracy the response to the problems associated 
with the indicator project, which are characterized by, if  anything, an even greater 
tendency towards rationalism than the project itself.
Indeed, it seems that the temptation towards centralization and certitude in the 
production and use of  indicators is almost inescapable once the indicator culture has 
taken hold. The rationalist tendency, unable or unwilling to leave too much space for 
the practical, for the experiential and for the tacit, always prefers the application of  
technique. This is most evidently the case for those who view the use of  globally deter-
mined quantitative measures as being essential to the realization of  human rights. 
‘While the criticisms and challenges to the creation of  international indicators for 
ESCR are informative’, as Welling rather revealingly puts it, ‘they do not justify allow-
ing the international community to remain uninformed about the deficiency of  ESCR 
protection and access around the world.’115 In other words, indicators may have their 
flaws, but the solution can only be the generation of  more data that the ‘international 
community’ can utilize. The cure is only ever technical in character; it is the produc-
tion of  frameworks and systems by which techniques of  indicator creation and usage 
can come to be implemented. The alternative is for the ‘international community’ to 
be uninformed.
Thus, the first step in the next stage of  rights-based development is identified as ‘the 
compilation of  an internationally agreed and scientifically adequate list of  core devel-
opment indicators for civil and political rights, based on international standards’;116 
the solution to conceptual problems surrounding economic, social and cultural rights 
is presented as being the development of  more detailed suites of  indicators by the 
113 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, supra note 32, at 32.
114 ICHRP, supra note 2, at 4.
115 Welling, supra note 10, at 958.
116 Mokhiber, supra note 68, at 9.
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CESCR so as to give ‘concrete meaning’ to those rights,117 and the solution to discrep-
ancies between agreed minimum standards for humanitarian relief  due to differing 
local contexts is presented as ‘[describing] the gap between the standards and indica-
tors listed in the handbook and the ones reached in actual practice … [and explaining] 
what needs to be changed’.118 The OCHCHR’s guide, which acknowledges the limita-
tions of  the use of  indicators in its opening pages, argues that the solution is stron-
ger involvement of  human rights stakeholders in their production.119 The problems 
associated with being half  right are often resolved, that is, through the application of  
technique; through ever more rationalistic responses.
The tendency of  rationalism to perpetuate itself  is also apparent even where the 
entire indicator project is viewed with scepticism. Thede, for instance, while acknowl-
edging the dangers of  ‘statistical mystique’, the value-laden nature of  indicators, the 
difficulty or impossibility of  capturing values in numerical form and the prospect of  a 
‘productivist’ approach undermining human rights themselves, still comes to the con-
clusion that what is required is to ‘establish what are the component aspects of  each 
right, what the relationship of  each component is to the overall respect of  that right 
and, finally, what are the indicators that can generate meaningful information about 
one or the other of  the components of  that right’ – in short, a ‘theory to link concept to 
indicator’.120 In other words, these issues are to be resolved with the application of  rea-
son to reach solutions, which is precisely the type of  effort undertaken by the OHCHR 
to centralize and systematize a conceptual framework for determining and measuring 
the attributes of  each and every human right.
Merry, meanwhile, in a careful and considered analysis of  the problems associ-
ated with human rights indicators (noting that they are unrepresentative, depen-
dent on the cooperation of  states parties to the treaties, dependent on ranking to 
have any effect, decontextualized and ahistorical and lacking a sanction  mechanism 
for failures of  implementation) comes to the apparent conclusion that what is 
required is simply more ‘powerful’ indicators permitting ranking, punishment for 
lack of  achievement and, above all, ‘clear theory embedded in the indicator’ – in 
other words, more simplification, more clarity and more streamlining.121 The prob-
lems associated with the application of  technique are cured by the application of  yet 
more of it.
And despite an extensive and considered critique of  the development of  the indica-
tor project, Rosga and Satterthwaite similarly propose a solution that boils down to the 
production of  a set of  outcome indicators produced by the treaty bodies, the OHCHR 
and NGOs, to be applied universally. Here, the approach adopted by Fukuda-Parr and 
colleagues, that is, ‘ranking countries by measuring the relationship between the 
extent to which a population enjoys fundamental economic and social rights and the 
resource capacity of  the state to fulfil ESR obligations’ is cited as promising, though 
117 de Beco, supra note 67, at 40.
118 Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, Sphere Project (2004), at 8–9.
119 OHCHR, supra note 17, at 4.
120 Thede, supra note 59, at 268.
121 Merry, supra note 28.
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how this approach avoids the pitfalls identified by the authors is not made clear.122 
Political conversation at the domestic level is to continue, but only if  it is framed 
around the universally applicable Donabedian model, with the power to determine 
structural and process indicators devolved to the national level – outcome indicators 
having been centrally mandated. In addition, indicators must be created to measure 
political participation so as to avoid the bypassing of  political discourse in domestic 
politics.123 The solution to the pitfalls of  governmentality, it turns out, is more of  it. 
What is required is the utilization of  indicators to permit global governance to inter-
face with the governed more directly.124
The rationalist propensity’s tendency to propose rationalist solutions is well illus-
trated by the fact that even Stone is still tempted, ultimately, to suggest that what is 
required is an ‘iterative method’ for the construction of  global indicators. That is, since 
he is unwilling to entirely leave the production and use of  indicators to practitioners 
or experts, whether liaising across borders or otherwise, Stone eventually comes to 
the proposition that there ought to be a ‘system or framework of  indicators that can 
be used across countries, in very different national contexts’.125 While this ought to be 
produced from the ‘bottom up’, the character of  the rationalist still lurks in the back-
ground in that the end result seems to remain a globally produced and universally 
applicable system. The rationalist propensity is unsatisfied with any approach that 
does not, ultimately, lead to the uniform and certain application of  principle, however 
this is produced. While there is promise, then, in the notion of  indicators produced 
and consumed by those in positions of  legitimate authority, as Stone suggests, there 
must come with it a wariness of  rationalist tendencies towards uniformity and cer-
tainty in different guises.
7 Conclusion
Describing the indicator project, and the indicator culture that surrounds it, as 
 ‘rationalist’ gives us a fruitful method for understanding not only its flaws but also its 
growth. What, then, is to be proposed? One obvious critique of  Oakeshott’s position is 
that, as elsewhere in his work, he seems to present a bleak scenario in which matters 
have progressed too quickly and too far in the wrong direction to ever be reversed.126 
He appears to present us with a vision of  a rationalist tendency that grows ever more 
pronounced until there is space for nothing else. This article considers that vision to be 
compelling but, at the same time, recognizes that there is considerably more nuance 
122 S. Fukuda-Parr, T.  Lawson-Remer and S.  Randolph, Measuring the Progressive Realization of  Human 
Rights Obligations: An Index of  Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment, Economics Working Paper 
No. 200822 (2008), available at http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200822 (last visited 
14 April 2016).
123 See Rosga and Satterthwaite, supra note 81, at 312–314.
124 Ibid., at 315.
125 Ibid., at 292–294.
126 See, in particular, Oakeshott, ‘The Tower of  Babel’, in Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, supra note 32, 59.
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both to Oakeshott’s position and to the current status of  human rights monitoring. In 
fact, there always remains the possibility of  a reversal so long as there is the ‘positive 
power’ of  defence against overweening rationalism.127
First, this must take the form of  a greater awareness of  the importance of  balance 
between technical and the practical knowledge. There must be a greater acknowl-
edgement of  the importance of  the role that the ‘pesky, irreducible core of  human 
judgment’ has to play in monitoring human rights performance. Human societies are 
complex, and their niceties in many ways defy quantitative measurement. The neces-
sity for the kind of  tacit, practical knowledge that only comes about through deep 
familiarity with the subject matter cannot be overstated. Attempting to monitor per-
formance through technique, especially if  technical methods come to dominate the 
landscape, will always fall foul of  the tendency to be, at best, half  right – ignorant of  
the intuitive, tacit, subjective understanding of  what is best that comes about only 
from experience and practice and, hence, leading to poor decisions and unintended 
consequences.
Second, there must be a greater level of  scepticism about solutions to the problems 
associated with rationalism, which themselves hold technique to be sovereign. It is 
tempting, when faced with concerns about the misuse of  statistics, the growth of  
technocracy and international governmentality, and the denuding of  moral discourse 
associated with the turn to human rights auditing, to propose – as amply illustrated 
by the examples in the previous section – even more technocratic solutions that cede 
yet more power to the processes in question. This temptation must be resisted, or at 
the very least questioned: the pitfalls of  a preoccupation with technique will not be 
avoided by the application of  more of it.
And third, this article has summarized some of  the dangers associated with indica-
tor projects constructed at the international level, divorced both from domestic and 
local political discourse and the work of  local human rights practitioners. In particu-
lar, it has expressed strong concerns with the notion that either indicators themselves, 
or systems for producing and utilizing them, should become universal and uniform – 
that the rationalist desire for certainty, centralization and the application of  precept 
should come to dominate. Rather, the preference must surely be for human rights 
indicators that are used in a manner similar to that which Stone describes, namely 
created by and for local actors who have operational responsibility and accountability 
for what is being measured. This may go against the prevailing tendency among those 
interested in the international monitoring of  human rights, which finds it deeply 
unsatisfactory and, indeed, even dangerous to see the conceptualization and mea-
surement of  human rights as something in need of  decentralization. Yet this article 
demonstrates why such a rebalancing is needed. Otherwise, the risk is of  diminishing 
moral discourse in human rights and thus removing discussion about what rights are, 
and what they protect, from the conversation of  human societies – a prospect that 
cannot but be detrimental to their realization.
127 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, supra note 32, at 35.
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